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I.		e anti-US incidents likely during trip.
	Α.	Major demonstrations possible in Panama and Guatemala.
	в.	Commies capable organizing demonstrations in Costa Rica,
		El Salvador, and Guatemala.
	C.	However, US embassies trying to avoid mass gatherings, and
		conditions conducive to anti-US demonstrations probably not
		as great now as when visit originally scheduled.
II.	In <u>I</u>	Panama, De la Guardia govt is weakunder attack from power-
	ful	opponents who using student and other nationalistic, anti-
	US g	groups.
25X1A6A	A.	agitators may try incite
	_	disturbances during expected student demonstrations.
	1	1. But student leaders urging peaceful demonstrations.
5X1X6		2. Commies, weak in Panama, but with some influence among
		students, also urging avoidance
		violence by studentsbecause it might split student
		movement.
		3. National Guard, making exhaustive preparations, believed
		capable controlling all but major disturbances.
	В。	Nationalist campaign for increased share of Canal income
		and recognition of Panamanian sovereignty in Canal Zone sure
		to come up.
		1. Opposition accuses US of complicity in deaths of nine

Panamanians killed in the riots of last May--because

hard-pressed National Guard was supplied with anti-riot Approved For Release 2002/06/11: CIA-RDP79R00890A001000030026-5

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equipment from the Canal Zone upon request Panamanian govt.

- Honduran govt unstable, treasury nearly empty, and administration faced with potentially serious labor problem among employees of United Fruit.
 - A. No known plans for anti-US demonstrations during visit but

 Commies have some assets among students and other groups in

 capital and could arouse them to demonstrations.

В.

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- C. Danger of United Fruit strike during visit now lessened by assurances both sides that they will continue negotiations: beyond expiration labor contract 14 July.
- IV. Costa Rican government is democratic and stable, but small, well-disciplined CP trying to promote disturbances during visit.
 - A. Govt security forces weakened by thorough shakeup which followed change of administrations in May.
 - B. Costa Ricans generally friendly to US, however, and demonstrations, if any, will probably be small.
- V. In Nicaragua, there are unlikely to be serious problems. Opposition leaders will probably repeat allegations that US has given undue support to late dictator Somoza and his sons who now run country.
 - VI. In El Salvador, Commies have ability to promote hostile demonstrations and preparations by Commies for anti-US parade.
 - A. Police willing and able to control any demonstrations, by force if necessary.

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- VII. Greatest danger is in <u>Guatemala</u>, where Commies are strongest and govt weak and indecisive.
 - A. Commies expect to take some action during visit, but had not finalized plans as of 8 July.

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- When Fisenhower visit was expected in June. Commies
- 2. When Eisenhower visit was expected in June, Commies planned to promote mass demonstrations but if the govt seemed ready to prevent them, they were to be staged prior to Dr Eisenhower's arrival.
- 3. Commie students implied in June that they would use violence against Dr Eisenhower.
- B. Much depends on willingness, ability Ydigoras and army to take strong stand against Commies.
 - 1. Ydigoras recently made his first strong anti-Commie statements since becoming President, but he has as yet done nothing to reduce significantly Commie capabilities.
 - 2. Army has shown itself in past unwilling to use strong measures to suppress sizeable demonstrations.